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Thinking as Testing the Limits of Friendship: 
On the Voegelin-Schütz correspondence 
Arpad Szakolczai 
 
A review essay on A Friendship That Lasted a Lifetime: The Correspondence Between Alfred 
Schütz and Eric Voegelin, edited by Gerhard Wagner and Gilbert Weiss, translated by 
William Petropoulos, University of Missouri Press, Columbia (MO) and London, 2011, 
ISBN: 082621911X 
 
The exchange of letters between Eric Voegelin and Alfred Schütz took place in between 
1938, or the year in which both were forced to leave Vienna due to the annexation of 
Austria by Nazi Germany, and 1959, when Schütz passed away. Several of the more 
important letters were published previously in various contexts, and the project of 
publishing them all goes back to the 1970s. The entire correspondence, in the original 
German, only appeared in 2004. This book is a comprehensive selection and English 
translation of that volume. 
 The book provides fascinating insights into the lives, times, works, and ideas of 
two master thinkers – though mostly to those who are already reasonably familiar with 
them. While the editors rightly state in their Introduction (the English version is a slightly 
modified translation of the German text) that it was not the place for a comprehensive 
reassessment of the work in light of this correspondence (p.5), more background details 
for a volume like this would have been helpful. However, the size of the book, both in 
English (261 pp.) and especially in German (579 pp.), might explain the limited space left 
for the ‘Editor’s Introduction’ (5 pages of text, followed by 2 full pages of notes). 
 The most interesting part of the correspondence, without any doubt, are the 
often quite long letters that touch upon the heart of the work of the two thinkers, 
sparked by Voegelin’s first comments on reading Husserl’s Crisis. As both of them 
considered the other a privileged interlocutor, the ideas expressed have particular 
significance for the thinking of each. The exchange of letters is revealing not only 
concerning the substance of their disagreement, but also the manner in which this was 
addressed and handled. Here a central issue is played by the question of friendship. 
 
Intellectual friendship 
 
The title of the book, taken verbatim from a 1958 letter by Voegelin (p. 201), rightly 
places the emphasis on the close personal friendship that existed between the two 
thinkers, going back to their university years. In our world, dominated by interests and 
other ‘rational’ considerations, it is practically inconceivable how much both academic 
and political life, in classical Antiquity as in the Renaissance or in the early modern times, 
was based, as a norm and as a fact, on friendship.1 The dividing line, not surprisingly, can 
be drawn with the Enlightenment, with its emphasis on critique and on adherence to 
ideological positions where, supposedly in the name of ‘truth’, personal relations were 
relegated into irrelevance, if not outright signs of favoritism and corruptness. The lasting, 
at once personal and intellectual friendship between Voegelin and Schütz could indeed 
be considered as something like a swan-song of this ideal. Significantly, in their 
generation, the generation of WWI thinkers – those who gained maturity during WWI – 
there were other examples;2 while among the WWII generation it is difficult to identify 
one single relevant example. 
 Acknowledging the significance of ‘intellectual friendship’, the rest of the review 
will be devoted to the question of the substantive ideas that emerged from this exchange 
of letters, and to the manner in which disagreements were eventually handled. It is 
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exactly for such a purpose that the recent publication is of vital importance. While the 
content of the most important letters were known before, it is only with this publication 
that it is possible to reconstruct the exact dynamics of the interaction – something that, 
from the perspective of the experiential basis of thought, a central idea of Voegelin, is a 
matter of substance. 
 
 
Voegelin’s Husserl reading experience and its effects 
 
The edition, quite rightly, focuses on the exchange of letters generated by Voegelin’s 
reading of Husserl’s Crisis, and its eventual follow-ups. This will also be the focus of this 
review essay, which discusses the three main cluster points of this exchange: the first 
lasting from Voegelin’s letter of 17 September 1943 up to his letter of 28 December; the 
second from Voegelin’s letter of 7 November 1949 up to his letter of 30 April 1951; 
while the third starts again with a letter by Voegelin (15 September 1952), and closes with 
his letter of 10 January 1953. Even this short resume renders evident the dominant role 
of Voegelin, given that each step of the exchange of starts with his letters. Their 
conclusion, however, reveals rather more about Schütz, as each step ended by the 
decision of Schütz not to reply. We need to understand the significance of such silences, 
just as what was exactly stated. 
 
Step One: September to December 1943 
 
We must start by reconstructing the experiential basis of the first letter, faithful to the 
concept that Voegelin would later develop, largely on the basis of this reading of Husserl. 
After his first academic year spent in Louisiana, Voegelin meets Schütz, and other 
friends, in New York, for the rare pleasure of intense intellectual discussion. One of 
them, Fritz Kaufmann, lent Voegelin Husserl’s book, which he immediately read after his 
return home on 13 September, and already on the 17th he wrote an 11-page long typed 
letter, sparked by his reading experience. From the perspective of ‘rationalism’, it could 
well be considered a product of haste, lacking maturity; however, from an experiential 
perspective, it might contain particularly clear traces of the spirit and substance of the 
experience. 
 Crisis is often seen as Husserl’s most important work, where he frankly addresses 
the question of the role played by the type of knowledge and rationality propagated by 
the natural sciences in the ongoing crisis – science and knowledge, thus, as culprits, and 
not as solution. Voegelin, however, while acknowledging the character of the work and 
the standing of Husserl, does not buy the argument, and places the emphasis rather on 
the still shared commonalities between the type of techno-scientific ‘rationality’ that was 
– and still is – wreaking havoc on the world, and the type of philosophical tradition to 
which Husserl still claims to belong – which he considers in a matter of fact way as the 
only one existing. This tradition, however, to be traced back to Descartes and continued 
by Kant, is rather singularly impoverished due to its ignoring the spiritual aspect of 
human existence, in particular the experience of transcendence. This shortcoming is 
hidden by the ideology of progress, animating the singularly unfortunate but revealing 
expression by which Husserl defined as a ‘functionary’ of mankind (p.33). Thus Husserl’s 
thinking, at its recognised height, is not fundamentally different from the various mass 
ideologies which cover their shortcomings by luring the unwary through trickful 
promises into abandoning themselves and taking a leap into following their ultimate aims 
– which is ultimately a leap into nothingness. 
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 Instead, real philosophy, according to Voegelin, does not consist in enclosing 
oneself behind the walls of a closed, self-sustaining theoretical-ideological system, which 
attempts to refuse, indeed pre-empt, any critique in the pretence of uttering statements 
that are beyond doubt, rather one that penetrates the thoughts of other thinkers, up to 
their basic experiences (the term ‘engendering’ is not yet here), including, in particular, 
experiences of transcendence (p.38). In a particularly felicitous expression, Voegelin calls 
particular attention to the ‘ “personal testimonies” of the thinkers themselves’ (p.39), 
from which a proper understanding should not stray away. 
 The line of thinking characterised by Descartes, Kant and Husserl, far from 
representing the culmination of the European tradition, is rather an erratic departure 
from the basic principles of classical thinking, the distance from this tradition only 
increasing with time, with every new generation failing to learn from the errors of the 
predecessors. A particularly good example is the so-called ‘proof of God’ problem, a 
major source of Kant’s fame, though Kant simply failed to grasp that the point was not 
to prove ‘beyond doubt’ that God exists (a nonsensical effort that would have rendered 
faith meaningless), rather was a meditation on the nature of the experience of 
transcendence.  
 The ultimate problem with the tradition started by Descartes, of course, concerns 
the elevation of doubt into the animating principle of the ‘rational’ method of ‘critique’, 
and the subsequent closing of experience into the horizon of the consciousness of the 
ego. Instead, Voegelin calls for a return to classical thinking, and the search for 
meaningful, positive anthropological foundations for thinking – like grace, beauty, order, 
virtue, or the good life. 
 
As Schütz’s life-work was devoted to the re-founding of Weberian sociology on the 
principles of Husserl’s phenomenology, it is not surprising that he was quite taken aback 
by Voegelin’s comments. Yet, the exact modality was quite peculiar, and invites 
reflection. It starts with a delay in responding to, or even acknowledging, such a major 
letter, so 11 days later Voegelin sends another one, now about his reading of Schütz’s 
articles, with the evident aim of inquiring about an answer. Two days later, on 30 
September Schütz indeed responds, though apparently before receiving Voegelin’s 
follow-up letter – or only making seem so, as at that time two days were enough for a 
letter to arrive. Schütz’s letter, however, is rather an explicit non-response, and on several 
counts. It starts by admitting his surprise, his lack of preparation for such a letter; and his 
inability to give a response, so far, due to a lack of inner peace. He also asks permission 
to show it to others. Over three weeks later another letter from Schütz announces the 
strange and – especially then – most embarrassing news that he misplaced the letter; so 
Voegelin will have to type the entire thing again. What is even more surprising, 
eventually this copy would also be lost, as not be found among Schütz’s papers. In about 
another three weeks, on 11 November 1943 (a date not without its own significance, 
being the 25th anniversary of the end of WWI – especially for Schütz, who participated in 
the Great War as a soldier), and having in the meanwhile received three further letters 
from Voegelin, the response is finally written and sent. 
 This response, not surprisingly given the time elapsed, is structured in order to 
refute, in the most resolute and efficient manner, Voegelin’s criticism of Husserl. First, in 
contrast to Voegelin’s complaining about the distance and the lack of possibility for 
personal discussion, Schütz valorises such distance – also the time elapsed – as it allowed 
him to express more precisely his argument (p.49). Second, and seemingly in the spirit of 
Voegelin, he starts by emphasising the long-term personal connection he had with 
Husserl, which would seem to render his account more authoritative (thus, a genuine 
‘personal testimony’ – though the sense is different from Voegelin’s), while explaining 
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the otherwise evident personal significance of the entire issue for him – subtly but 
unmistakenly implying that Voegelin’s critique of his mentor was something of an 
unprovoked assault. On this basis, the central thrust of the argument is simply to restate 
Husserlian orthodoxy, and make Voegelin appear as an idiosyncratic outsider to the 
tradition of European thought. In particular, he reasserts that the Husserlian undertaking, 
not simply from the academic perspective of a ‘critique of knowledge’, but through his 
idea of ‘philosophy as a rigorous science’ (p.50), is indeed fundamental; and the apodictic 
method developed by Husserl, aiming at arriving at statements that cannot be doubted, 
indeed achieves the final foundations of philosophy. These foundations touch upon the 
anthropological essence of the human being, here reinforcing the Kantian perspective 
according to which ‘rationality’ is the most important anthropological constant of 
mankind. Husserl’s undertaking, through his striving for the self-understanding of the 
philosopher is the culmination of the European philosophical tradition, while at the same 
time it contributes to the solution of the current crisis. Finally, truly as if he wanted to 
have his cake and eat it, this philosophy by no means represents a final, conclusive 
system, ‘only’ the final foundation, thus the definite beginning. The road ahead is infinite, 
we are only at the beginnings; one would need the life of a Methuselah to make a 
substantial move forward (p.56); but the way only lies on these apodictic foundations, 
which is the central legacy of European philosophy. This conclusive assertiong, while 
seeming to refute the charges of dogmatism and finality, does two enormous harms at 
the same time: it rules out of court any effort to question the direction of philosophy 
taken by the triad Descartes-Kant-Husserl, the road of doubt, critique and a permanent 
undermining of any meaning and solidity; while – purportedly in order to avoiding 
dogmatism – it decisively inaugurates at the heart of the philosophical undertaking a 
resignation to a permanent and eternal temporariness. 
 
It is not clear when Schütz actually sent the letter, programmatically dated 11 November. 
In a follow-up letter, sent on 25 December, he claims to have sent the letter so that 
Voegelin could read it before Christmas – which certainly implies that it was actually 
posed well over a month after it was purportedly written. At any rate, a letter of 21 
December by Voegelin makes it clear that by that time he has not yet received Schütz’s 
response. But it did arrive before Christmas; and already on 28 December Voegelin 
wrote and posted in response another 11-page long, densely typed letter. 
 
Voegelin starts at the same tone as Schütz, acknowledging the importance of distance for 
the precise formulation of ideas, and of closeness in terms of personal familiarity with 
Husserl, only further underlined by the fact that Voegelin had no access to Husserl’s 
unpublished work. He therefore apologises for any related misunderstanding – though, 
as we’ll see, based on his ‘method’ he comes up with an understanding of Husserl that in 
depth goes beyond Schütz’s, which was weighed down, as he would eventually 
acknowledge, by the ‘magical’ force of Husserl’s dominating personality. 
 The response is organised around two central issues. On the one hand, Voegelin 
claims that the definite advances in thought, attributed to Husserl, rather constitute a 
closed system which becomes impossible to escape for the incautious who was lured 
inside it by its promises – exactly like it happens with the different modalities of the 
modern revolutionary tradition. Husserl’s approach is a-historical and a-spiritual, 
pretending to be pure, rigorous science, yet its appeal is due to a combination of 
eschatological promises – like infinite progress, definite foundations, the final 
understanding of man’s place in the universe; and the personal messianistic appeal of 
Husserl’s personality. Husserlian philosophy, thus, far from representing the last word in 
thinking, is rather oriented to the establishment of a closed apocalyptic sect, animated by 
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a ‘gospel of philosophical reason’ (p.65). Thus reversing Schütz’s assertion and charge, it 
does not represent ‘the’ philosophical tradition, compared to which Voegelin is a 
marginal idiosyncratic outsider; rather, it is a deviation from the classical tradition, which 
Voegelin proposes to renew and continue.  
 Central to this real European philosophical tradition – and Voegelin here to a 
large extent reiterates ideas already expressed in his first letter – is the personal depth of 
concrete thinkers, whose philosophising is motivated by their own personal experiences. 
Here a prominent place is taken up by experiences of transcendence, but also central is 
the awareness about the concrete historical ‘situation’ in which thinkers find themselves, 
in particular if this situation constitutes a ‘crisis’. Here Voegelin’s ideas strongly rely on 
the thinking of Jaspers, whose work is singled out for attention as a most important 
contemporary effort (p,69). And as a crisis is fundamentally due to a dissolution of order, 
to a large extent due to the dissolution of myth, the ‘effort to establish order’ (p.69) 
constitutes a prime aim of thinking. And it is exactly to this primary task that ‘one of the 
great strands of tradition contributes very little […] the thread of the transcendental 
critique of knowledge that runs from Descartes to Husserl (p.70). And the reason for 
this, touched but evaded in Husserl’s Crisis, is very simple: this tradition of ‘rationalism’ is 
part of the cause of the problem, and not its solution; a recognition that is shared by Max 
Weber (p.69). However, here, formulating as a positive task of thinking the creation of 
order, Voegelin moves dangerously beyond what can be assigned as the task of a 
thinking person. 
 
As one can see, the elements of Voegelin’s thought are almost the same as Husserl’s: 
personal knowledge, crisis, reflexivity on the times, conviction in the significance of 
thinking. However, in Husserl’s thinking, the elements confused, thus the lure, even 
blackmail to follow, is greater, constituting a trap, just as in the cases of Freud, Marx, or 
even Durkheim; while Voegelin’s thinking constitutes a harmonious whole, with 
everything in its proper place – or almost, as we have already seen the problem 
concerning the ‘solution’ of the problem of order. 
 
This letter is left unanswered by Schütz; and indeed the conversation became stalled. 
Voegelin’s further, probing letters, just as the attached, crucial essays on Nietzsche, 
Pascal the crisis and the War, sections of the History of Political Ideas, remain unanswered. 
A gesture of re-opening is only made by Schütz with a letter of 17 March 1945, where he 
acknowledges the ‘inexcusably long time’ for not writing to his friend (p.74), and asks for 
more sections of the History of Political Ideas manuscript. Voegelin promptly complies, and 
the exchange takes off again, restored to the more limited aim of commenting this work.  
 
Step Two: November 1949 to April 1951 
 
The conversation re-gained depth, and thus interest, only about four and a half years 
later, on 7 November 1949 (interestingly, another major political anniversary, this time of 
the Russian Revolution), when – in the context of an exchange about the History of 
Political Ideas manuscript – Voegelin returned to some of the fundamental philosophical 
questions that were previously approached in the context of his Husserl reading 
experience.  
 The letter reiterates some of the main, and most controversial, themes of the 
previous correspondence, about the historicity of truth, due to the event-like character of 
the major transcendental experiences that are the basis of philosophising, and the 
necessary spiritual preconditions for a genuinely rational thinking, in contrast to the 
positing of individual reasoning power as some kind of anthropological foundation. The 
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letter contains one fundamental new idea, the importance of persuading power (peitho), 
whose appearance Voegelin traces to Aeschylus and Plato (p.130). The appeal is to the 
spirit, assuming a fundamental likemindedness (the Aristotelian homonoia) as genuine 
anthropological foundation, in contrast to sheer force, political activism, or mere 
reasoning. Within mentioning Descartes, Kant or Hobbes, though evidently implying 
them, Voegelin focuses his attack on Hobbes as the origin of modern psychology, which 
‘emerged as the empirical science of the spiritually disoriented, merely motivated, human 
being’ (p.131).  
 No reply came this time from Schütz, and – apart from a courtesy letter – no 
exchange of any substance takes place until April 1951, when on the 15th Voegelin sends 
the Introduction to the New Science of Politics. Schütz now replies quite quickly, on the 
22nd, though the letter is only finished and sent off on the 27th, and starts by giving the 
reasons for his silence: he got the ‘impression’, from some of Voegelin’s earlier letters, 
that their ‘ways had parted’ (p.135). This could only refer to the 7 November 1949 letter; 
and the reason could only be that Schütz felt that a return to the controversial themes of 
1943, left unanswered then by him, was a hostile act on the part of Voegelin, touching 
upon delicate aspects of Schütz’s identity (given that matters of ideas and identity for 
genuine thinkers, but to a large extent for any academic, can never be separated). The 
letter is clearly conciliatory in tone, trying to re-build bridges on shared understanding, 
including a common hostility to ‘positivism’ (an eternal means for social scientists to 
bridge differences in face of a common enemy), and the thinking of Max Weber as a 
fundamental and shared positive reference point, which of course recalls their formative 
experiences at the University of Vienna right after WWI. It is by referring to Weber’s 
ideas concerning the ‘relevance’ of a work that however remains ‘value free’, thus not 
being tied to a political and religious position, that Schütz introduces his recent work 
concerning relevance, a the same time sheltering it from Voegelin’s threatening 
incorporation of spirituality and transcendence. 
 Voegelin’s response is again immediate and overwhelming, on all counts. It is full 
of joy that his friend again responded; most distressed by the reasons for his long silence; 
and goes out of his way to avoid upsetting him again. The response is not very long, at 
any rate significantly shorter than Schütz’s letter; it reassures his friend about the 
fundamentally shared elements of their ideas; and takes up the concrete issue of 
relevance, central to Schütz’s current work. However, this does not and cannot mean 
that he retreated from his position. Quite on the contrary, Voegelin must state that the 
problem extends to Weber; that his sociology lacks the proper foundations in 
philosophical anthropology (and not merely in epistemology, as Schütz would have 
wanted); and that thus the fundamental issue concerns something ‘positive’, at the level 
of values – not the kind of politicised values Weber rightly dismissed, but the questions 
of philosophical anthropology that ‘culminates in the understanding of man as that thing 
capable of transcendental experiences’ – an issue that Weber simply evaded (pp.141-2). 
 This letter again remains unanswered, but there is no break this time – Schütz 
responded positively to the sections of the manuscript Voegelin would send him, and the 
contact is thus re-established. 
 
Step Three: September 1952 to January 1953 
 
The third, and final, stage of the correspondence about fundamental issues of 
philosophical anthropology started in September 1952. The context is again crucial: after 
a long gap, the two friends finally met personally; and New Science of Politics was just about 
to being published. The short letter starts by Voegelin’s enthusiastic comments on two 
papers by Schütz, where the analysis of the shortcomings of the thinking of Sartre and 
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Santayana, their arbitrary elimination of the experiences of the spirit, and the question of 
the constitution of the ‘Thou’, were exposed with evident affinities to Voegelin’s ideas. It 
is this affinity that pushes Voegelin to re-state his position that these questions cannot be 
properly approached from the work of Husserl, starting from the ‘I’, thus prioritising 
distancing, but must start ‘from undifferentiated participation in the being of other […] 
existences’, again founding the tradition inaugurated by Descartes singularly unhelpful, 
and thus trying to convince Schütz – evidently using the ‘gentle’ persuasion of peitho – 
that his own work on action and choice requires a positive foundation, in the order of 
‘goods and virtues’ (p.148).  
 In his reply, written after about three weeks, Schütz now accepts the substance of 
Voegelin’s critique of Husserl (p.150), a very major concession, together with the 
importance attributed to ‘the primordial participation of those who exist’ (Ibid.). Yet, he 
tries to defend and reassert the particular approach to the study of action and choice 
taken by him, motivated by an effort to study what is simply ‘ “unquestionably given” ’ in 
everyday life. He claims that Plato or Aristotle is of no use to this undertaking, as they 
saw no problem there; and thus he takes exception, in a particularly strong manner, to 
what he perceives as the exclusiveness inherent in Voegelin’s reasoning: ‘But why, why, 
why do you assume such a monopolistic-imperialistic position?’ (p.151).  
 Voegelin’s response is again quick (within a week of receipt), and relatively short; 
for details, it simply sends his friend to his book, just about to appear. It basically 
reiterates the point about the need for a philosophical anthropology and the deficiency of 
the Cartesian tradition of starting from a ‘monadizing isolation of consciousness’ (p.152). 
Careful enough not to spell it out explicitly, he tries to render Schütz sensitive to the fact 
that the very way he posed his problem, in his previous letter, might still be fatally caught 
up in this tradition. 
 The response of Schütz now came within somewhat less than three weeks – 
though it was not a real response, only a promise of one: a response to the letter, and 
also to the book, which meanwhile have arrived. It was in fact finalised sometime in 
November 1952, and is the longest letter of the entire book, running up to 15 book 
pages (pp.155-69). The general tone of the letter is very positive and conciliatory. He 
starts by saying that he ‘basically’ thinks that Voegelin ‘completely’ understood him; 
accepts the failure of the Cartesian monadic thinking, even states that the failure to 
confront its shortcomings, ‘right down to the present day’, is ‘a scandal of philosophy’ 
(p.159); and expresses the greatest admiration for the New Science of Politics. However, 
most of the long letter is devoted to two major points of critique that much anticipate 
the later criticism of the book. One of this, already alluded to in the 9 November 
preliminary letter, concerns the modern Gnosticism thesis; while the other, even more 
central to this letter, takes exception to Voegelin’s identification of modern secularism 
with a merely secularised version of Christian eschatology; or, basically, it advances 
Blumenberg’s defence of the ‘legitimacy of modernity’.  
 Concerning the problem of inner-worldly eschatology, the original central core of 
the History of Political Ideas project, before it was overshadowed by the modern 
Gnosticism thesis, Schütz especially challenges the claim that the connection was 
necessary, even considers it as a theoretical non sequitur (p.164), adding that for e.g. the 
escape into a dream-world, characteristic of modern romantic revolutionaries, is 
something completely different from an immanentisation of the Christian eschaton 
(p.168). Concerning Gnosticism, the charges are just as strong: Schütz accuses Voegelin 
of simply asserting a Christian position, thus reading his attack on Gnosticism as a 
renewal of the early Christian attacks on Gnostic heretics. Without going into further 
details, the position of the long letter can be resumed in the following claims: negatively, 
it tries to dismantle the vision of Voegelin concerning the shared Gnosticism of modern 
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politics, art, and science, accepting the Gnosticism of the radical revolutionaries, but not 
of the rational philosophers, and separating secularism from daydreaming; while 
positively it reasserts both the legitimacy of modernity and the crucial value of modern 
rationalism: ‘Why [for Voegelin] is ratio, reason, not a basic virtue rather the original sin?’ 
(p.168). 
 Due to an operation, Voegelin had to delay his response. It eventually came in 
two segments, on 1 and 10 January 1953, which together almost equal the length of 
Schütz’s letter. The first segment is concerned with the question of Christianity. It starts 
by throwing the ball back, claiming that the problem is not the inclusion but the 
exclusion of Christianity, characteristic of the modern treatment of the history of 
philosophy; argues that his anthropological position is not based on Christianity, rather 
on experiences of transcendence, which are shared by many religious and spiritual 
traditions; but adds that a definite novelty of Christianity concerns the manner in which 
the converting power of grace goes beyond the Platonic ‘forcing’ of the periagoge. Here 
particular importance is played by St. Thomas Aquinas’s ideas concerning fides caritata 
formata, and the misunderstandings surrounding the problem of the sacrificium intellectus 
(pp.173-4). Most of the letter is devoted to a long and most interesting presentation of 
what Voegelin considered as ‘ “essential” Christianity’ (pp.175-9). The second letter 
responds to Schütz’s arguments concerning modern secular eschatology and Gnosticism, 
reiterating the argument that secularization ‘in indeed re-divinization’, adding that 
modern Gnosticism is even more pathological, representing a ‘harrowing corruption of 
the soul’ (p.182), than its classical variants, which still had a degree of naiveté in their 
cosmological focus.  
 The second letter closes with a Postscript that arguably represents the height of 
the entire exchange; a crucial afterthought in which Voegelin rendered his position 
particularly clear – strikingly, using formulations by Heidegger, a thinker otherwise not 
held by him in the highest regard, but who – strikingly now for this entire exchange – in 
an early autobiography defined as the three most important thinkers for his formation 
Husserl, St. Thomas Aquinas, and St. Bonaventure – the last being, still strikingly, never 
properly recognised and discussed by Voegelin. The passage starts by discussing the 
Gnostic attempt to render the very posing of questions related to transcendence socially 
impossible (evidently alluding to the problem of ridicule, in my reading a crucial aspect of 
the ‘byzantinization’ of European culture); continues with a direct quote from Heidegger, 
capturing his own (i.e. Voegelin’s) position: ‘ “He who has no faith cannot think” ’; and 
ends by a transliteration of Heidegger’s position, according to which ‘immanent [here 
there is an unfortunate typo in the book – A.Sz.] speculation on being prevents the 
knowledge of being; “rationalism”, as he calls it, obstructs thought.’ (p.184). 
 
Epilogue: the friendship goes on 
 
This was a definite concluding word, especially given that Heidegger’s thinking, decades 
before, grew out of his overcoming of Husserl’s position; and indeed no answer came 
forth from Schütz. Yet, it did not create a break, as it happened twice before. A letter of 
23 March by Schütz acknowledges the delays in answering, attributing this to overwork, 
and – though the substance of Voegelin’s letters would never be touched – the 
correspondence would continue until Schütz’s death, thus making Voegelin to formulate, 
in a letter of 3 August 1958, the expression which gave the title to this book (p.201). 
And, as always, that claim was made in a very special context. Most concretely, the 
occasion was Schütz’s letter of 28 July, which stated, in the context of an imminent 
meeting in Europe, after a long – and, as it turned out, for the last – time, in no uncertain 
terms the central importance the reading of Voegelin’s work had for Schütz: ‘from no 
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work of our time have I profited so much, or derived so much pleasure, as I have from 
yours’ (p.200). The slightly broader context is from two other letters by Schütz, written 
slightly earlier and later, which demonstrate, after all, how much Voegelin’s ideas 
concerning Husserl, transcendence and Gnosticism made a genuine impact on Schütz. A 
letter of 11 June 1957, written after a conference, acknowledges that Voegelin’s ‘remarks 
on Husserl’s Gnosticism were of particular importance’ to him (p.192); while a letter of 
16 October 1958, written after a visit at the Husserl Archive in Louvain, sounds as a 
definite assessment, written after he (almost) managed to overcome the lure of the 
‘master’, classifying Husserl as ‘the supreme sorcerer who always overwhelms one, 
however many objections one may have to his philosophy’ (p.202). One wonders 
whether this was exactly the sense in which Voegelin’s famous but much lamented essay 
about Hegel as a sorcerer should be understood. 
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Notes 
 
1 The term ‘Aristotlean friendship’ is mentioned by the editors (p.4); see also von 
Heyking (2008). 
2 See the friendship between Norbert Elias (born 1897) and Franz Borkenau (born 1900), 
or between Karl Kerényi and Béla Hamvas, the two most important Hungarian thinkers 
of the past century (both born 1897). Significantly enough, in both cases the events 
around WWII resulted in a definite breaking away. 
